Eclipse Attack
An attacker isolates a target node's peer connections to control its view of blocks and transactions.
Layer: network
Severity: high
Observed: No
Research
Attack Models
Filters
Selfish Mining
A miner withholds valid blocks strategically to increase expected revenue over fully honest publication.
Layer: mining
Severity: high
Observed: No
Fee Sniping
During extreme fee spikes, miners may have incentive to attempt short reorgs to capture recent fee-rich blocks.
Layer: economic
Severity: medium
Observed: No
Replace-by-Fee Abuse Pattern
Zero-confirmation recipients can be harmed when an attacker replaces a pending transaction with a higher-fee conflict.
Layer: mempool
Severity: medium
Observed: Yes
Lightning Channel Jamming
Attackers occupy HTLC slots and route capacity to degrade payment success for other users without necessarily stealing funds.
Layer: network
Severity: medium
Observed: No
Lightning Probing and Topology Leakage
Adversarial payment probes can infer channel balances, routing policy, or node behavior, reducing operational privacy.
Layer: network
Severity: medium
Observed: No
Lightning Pinning and Fee Griefing
Adversaries exploit mempool and fee dynamics to delay or worsen close-path transactions, raising risk/cost during disputes or congestion.
Layer: mempool
Severity: high
Observed: No
| Title | Layer | Severity | Observed | Linked Nodes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Eclipse Attack An attacker isolates a target node's peer connections to control its view of blocks and transactions. | network | high | No | |
Selfish Mining A miner withholds valid blocks strategically to increase expected revenue over fully honest publication. | mining | high | No | |
Fee Sniping During extreme fee spikes, miners may have incentive to attempt short reorgs to capture recent fee-rich blocks. | economic | medium | No | |
Replace-by-Fee Abuse Pattern Zero-confirmation recipients can be harmed when an attacker replaces a pending transaction with a higher-fee conflict. | mempool | medium | Yes | |
Lightning Channel Jamming Attackers occupy HTLC slots and route capacity to degrade payment success for other users without necessarily stealing funds. | network | medium | No | |
Lightning Probing and Topology Leakage Adversarial payment probes can infer channel balances, routing policy, or node behavior, reducing operational privacy. | network | medium | No | |
Lightning Pinning and Fee Griefing Adversaries exploit mempool and fee dynamics to delay or worsen close-path transactions, raising risk/cost during disputes or congestion. | mempool | high | No |